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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLAIMANTS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS AND HELPERS OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 16690

THE BOARD OF REVIEW, THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSON OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and THE INTERMOUNTAIN
OPERATORS LEAGUE,
Defendants.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants, local unions 222 and 976, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffers, and Helpers of America, represent members of those two unions who filed
claims for benefits for the period commencing with the 1st day of April, 1979, and
ending the 14th day of April, 1979. These claimants where denied benefits because it
was determined that their unemployment was due to a stoppage of work which existed
because of a strike at the establishments of their employers which involved their grade,
class or group. The claimants, through their authorized representatives, the aforesaid
local unions 222 and 976, filed a written appeal from this determination of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Department Representative. The matter was duly heard by the Appeal Referee, who, on
the 6th day of July, 1979, affirmed the decision of the Department Representative.
Claimants, again through their union representatives, appealed to the Board of Review
of the Industrial Commission. On the 21st day of August, 1979, by a majority decision,
the Board of Review upheld the decision of the Appeal Referee and the Department
Representative. The matter is now before this court on a petition for review filed by the
claimants through their unions, pursuant to Section 35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated
1953.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents Board of Review and Department of Employment Security agree
substantially with Appellants' Statement of Facts with respect to the identity of the
parties involved in this appeal, their relation to each other and the facts leading up to
the commencement of negotiations between Trucking Management, Inc. (TMI),
representing approximately 2,700 employers (R.000135), although it may have been as
few as 350 (R.00077). and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, representing
through its National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee its affiliated local unions.
Appellants have included a number of conclusions and assertions in their Statement of
Facts concerning the circumstances which led up to the strike. Because those
conclusions and assertions are not necessarily supported by the record, the following
summary is offered:
In 1976, the parties successfully negotiated a National Master Freight Agreements
to cover the period from 1976 to 1979. (R.00060, 000131, 000135, 00140)

It was due to

expire at midnight, March 31, 1979 (R.000140). On December 11, 1978, I BT notified the
employers of its desire to revise or change terms or conditions of the National Master
Freight Agreement and all area, regional, and local supplements. (R.00068)
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The Agreement clearly establishes that the parties constitute a single multi-union,
multi-employer collective bargaining unit. (R.00072)
Negotiations between TMI and the National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee of the I BT began on January 23, 1979, (R.00131) and continued to March 31, 1979.
(R.00142) On March 31, 1979, the national committee of the IBT notified TMI that it had
determined to take economic action in support of its demands of all employers.
commencing at midnight March 31, 1979. (R.00071; R.00123, 00124, 00125) On the
same day TMI notified the IBT that any attempt to deal with the employers individually
would be considered adverse to the integrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit.
(R.00061)
Economic sanction was in the form of a strike against selected employers.
(R.00077, 00125 - 00130) Only the National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee
of the IBT could determine which employers would be struck. (R.00125, 00126) In Utah
the employers struck were Consolidated Freightways, Garrett, Illinois; California
Express; and Pacific I ntermountain Express. (R.00128, 00129, 00131) After commencement of the strike by IBT, TMI determined to initiate a defensive shutdown of the other
employers. (R.00059) In response to TM l's instruction, IML engaged their defensive
shutdown. (00167) Consolidated Freightways also engaged in a defensive shutdown
in response to TM l's instruction, but only after pickets were established at their plant.
(R.00073, 00074,00104, 00157, 00158)
The purpose of limiting the economic action to a selective strike against only
certain employers was to avoid a Taft-Hartley injunction. (R.00125) Although "interim
agreements" were offered by IBT to many employers, those agreements contained
terms parallelling the demands of the I BT as of March 31, 1979, and did not constitute
an offer to continue working under the prior contract until a new settlement could be
reached. (R00105 through R.00122)
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The objective of the strike initiated by the IBT was to gain wage and benefit
improvements for all employees covered by the National Master Freight Agreement
(R.00160)
Settlement was reached between the IBT and the employers on April 10, 1979, and
the IBT pickets were removed. However, the work stoppage continued until April 14,
1979, when the Machinists' Unions removed their pickets and the Teamsters returned
to work. (R.00131, 00159)

POINTI

THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING BENEFITS TO THE CLAIMANTS WHO WENT ON STRIKE

Appellants contend that the Board of Review and the Appeal Referee erred in not
looking behind the strike to the reasons why the I BT felt it was necessary to call the
strike. They assert on appeal that the strike was compelled by the bad faith bargaining
ofTMI.
This court has previously held that the party which first resorts to work stoppage
will be held responsible in determining eligibility for unemployment compensation.
Olaf Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525, 243 P. 2d 951
(1952); Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment
Security, 13 Ut. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962). By implication, this court has concluded
that the Industrial Commission must consider the facts underlying any decision to
engage in a strike or lockout. Members of lronworkers' Union of Provo v. Industrial
Commission, (Utah, 1943) 139 P. 2d 208; Olaf Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial
Commission, supra, citing at p. 956 Bunny's Waffle Shoe v. California Employment
Commission, 24 Cal. 2d 735, 151 P. 2d 224.
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Appellants rest their assertion of bad faith bargaining on an affidavit of an IBT
attorney which contained only a conclusion of bad faith bargaining, but failed to set
forth any facts in support of that cone I usion other than a general statement that the last
economic proposal of the industry were inadequate in the opinion of the union.
(R.00102)

The employers, on the other hand, asserted that their last offer prior to the

strike was the maximum permitted under President Carter's pay standards. (R.00059)
Based upon such evidence the Appeal Referee properly concluded that the facts failed
to show that the employers' representatives refused or failed to bargain with the union.
In so holding, the Appeal Referee said:
The conclusion as to good faith can only be drawn from the facts in regard to
what took place during the period of negotiations. Lack of good faith cannot
be shown merely by a refusal to grant all requests and meet all demands. It is
well understood that reasonable and well-intentioned men will differ where
their various interests are in opposition. (R.00029)
Appellants content that another cause of the strike was government interference in
the collective bargaining processes. (Appellants' Brief, page 9) Appellants again rely
on the Affidavit of the Union attorney (R.00102) and a copy of the International
Teamster, an IBT publication. (R.00075 - 00077)

However, by Appellants' own

admission government involvement was limited to asserting that labor abide by
President Carter's Voluntary Wage and Price Guidelines, which labor was unwilling to
do. (See Appellants' Brief, page 11) No credible evidence was offered by Appellants to
show that government involvement in fact compelled the IBT to strike.
The finding of the Appeal Referee that the selective strike constituted economic
action against all employers is supported by substantial competent evidence. Not only
were the negotiations carried on betweeen all of the employers and unions acting as a
single collective bargaining unit, (R.00072) but the negotiations centered on improved
wages and benefits for all employees covered by the National Master Freight
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Agreement. (R 00071. 00123 - 00125)

The wage and benefit package finally agreed

upon did in fact benefit all employees so covered without regard to which employers
were struck, as will be more fully discussed in Point II hereof.
POINT II
THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING BENEFITS TO THOSE CLAIMANTS LOCKED OUT BY THEIR
EMPLOYERS.
Appellant contends that management was the real and fundamental cause of the
work stoppage, at least with respect to the employees of I ML and CF. However. by
Appellant's own admission CF was first struck by the union on April 1, before any
lockout occurred. (Appellant's Brief, page 13). CF was on the list of employers to be
struck on April 1, 1979. (R.00127, 00128) and, in fact, it was the first employer in Utah at
which picket lines were established. (R.00146, 00157, 00158) The order to strike was
received in Utah by the local Teamsters union about 2:00a.m. on April 1. (R.00146) The
picketing of CF occurred before CF notified Local 222 of its intent to engage in a
defensive shutdown (R.00158) which notice wasn't issued by CF until 9:45 p.m. on April
1, 1979. (R.00104) Thus, there can be no question that the labor union initiated the use
of economic sanctions against CF.

On the other hand, the facts are clear that IML was not struck by the union.
However, after it received notice from TMI that a selective strike had been called
against some of the employers IML commenced a defensive shutdown pursuant to
instructions from TMI. (R.00167)

"Appellant challenges the right to the employer group represented by TMI,
including IML, to consider a strike against one as a strike against all. This court faced
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that very question in the case of Olaf Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission. supra and concluded:
Our conclusion in this case is that the sounder view is to recognize these
large scale bargaining units as the groups involved within the meaning of the
Employment Security Act. Both labor and management have seen fit to resort
to such a device for a uniform, expedient means of negotiating their
agreements. There is no dispute that the economic sanction of the A.F. of L. in
this case was directed against the entire employer association. The strike was
called for and on behalf of every employee covered by the agreement. It
therefore directly involved all these claimants, at each particular place of
employment at which they were last employed. The strike was fomented by
claimants through their duly authorized union representatives. They are
members of the group which gained a raise in wages because of the strike and
are parties to the scheme or plan to foment it. (243 P. 2d, at p. 959)
In accord with the above is this court's decision in the case of Teamsters,
Chauffers, etc. v. Orange Transportation Company, et al, 5 Ut. 2d 45, 296 P. 2d 291
(1956), involving the same union and some of the same employers. The court there
held:
Our review of the record, as outlined above, indicates that there was evidence
from which Appeals Referee could find that the action of the Union was aimed
at the lntermountain Operator's League as a group with which it was
negotiating, that Orange and Inland were members of that group, and that the
strike was initiated for the purpose of forcing capitulation of all members of the
Employers' Group. Such findings may not be disturbed by this court so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence. (296 P. 2d, at p. 294)
Respondents readily concede that in order for the disqualification to apply to IML
employees there must be an affirmative showing that the group is engaged in a plan of
concerted action and that the action is in fact done for the group as part of the plan.
Teamsters, Chauffers, etc., v. Board of Review, etc., 10 Ut. 2d 63, 348 P. 2d 558, 561
(1960).
Appellant argues there is no evidence that a strike against one employer was a
strike against all. (Appellant's Brief, page 11) Yet, Appellant agrees that for a number of
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years the Teamsters and the lntermounta1n Operators League have been parties 1n
their representative capacities to the 1976 - 1979 National Master Freight Agreement
and that negotiations for modification of the Agreement were undertaken by the
parties, through their representatives, on a national basis. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 2, 3;
R.00068; 00140, 00141) By virtue of the terms contained in the National Master Freight

Agreement the employees, through their unions, constitute one bargaining unit, and
the employers and their associations constitute a single national multi-employer
bargaining unit. (R.00072) The negotiations on behalf of the employees was under the
direct and exclusive control of the National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee of
the IBT, (R.00155) and only the national committee of the I BT could determine whether
to take economic action and the nature of such action. (R.00125)
As shown from testimony in the hearing, a uniform settlement was eventually
reached by the parties, which applied to all of the carriers:
Fullmer:

Isn't it a fact, Mr. Haslam, that the ultimate settlement of the 1979
National Negotiations resulted in an economic package which
was applied uniformly to all of the carriers by that agreement?

Haslam:

That is true.

Fullmer:

And that your members were working for Garrett, P.1.E., Consolidated Freightways, ICX, received the same wage increases as
employees working at IML Freight?

Haslam:

That is correct.

Fullmer:

And it was the intention of the Union Negotiating Committee
throughout, that a uniform settlement be achieved, isn't that
true?

Haslam:

Well, naturally because of the ... that's what it's always been, labor.
(R.00160)

Appellants' contention that the employers were at fault or caused the strike by not
signing the Interim Agreement is wholly without merit. The great majority of courts of

o~~
.
th e various
states have consistently hel<Ji.hat an employer or labor group which offers
to continue working under an old contract pending settlement of a new contract will not
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be responsible if the other party refuses to accept the offer. Cases on this subject ara
collected at 62 ALR 3rd 437. and 63 ALR 3rd 88.

POINT Ill
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH OR
THE UNITED STATES
Appellants contend the volitional test as employed in the decision of the Appeal
Referee violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitutions of
the State of Utah and of the United States on three grounds.
First, Appellants contend the volitional test is arbitrary and unrelated to the object
of unemployment compensation legislation. Second, the volitional test is unsusceptible of definition or proof. Third, the volitional test violates public policy.
The volitional test is not set forth in the Utah Employment Security Act. However,
contrary to Appellants' assertion that it is a judicial invention, the volitional test has its
genesis in the Social Security Amendments of 1935, which established the basis for the
unemployment compensation system now existing in every state. The essence of the
unemployment compensation system was set forth by the Senate Finance Committee,
which stated:
"The essential idea in unemployment compensation is the creation of reserves
during periods of employment from which compensation is paid to workmen
who lose their positions when employment slackens and who cannot find
other work. Unemployment compensation differs from relief in that payments
are made as a matter of right, not on a needs basis, but only while the worker is
involuntarily unemployed. In all compensation systems the period during
which compensation is payable is limited in some relation to the previous
period of employment. Invariably there is a waiting period immediately
following unemployment during which no compensation is payable. Thereafter, compensation is paid at a stated percentage of the previous wage,
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customarily with both a minimum and a maximum rate. Payment of compensation is conditioned upon continued involuntary unemployment Beneficiaries must accept suitable employment offered them or lose their right to
compensation. After a specified period of time the compensation 1s d1scont1nued in any event." (Senate Report No. 628, 74th Congress, 1st Session, p. 11)
This court has previously held that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is
to assist the worker and his family in times when he is out of work without fault on his
part. Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment
Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962). Specifically, the declared public policy of

the statute is to establish financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed
through no fault of their own. Olaf Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission,
121 U. 525, 243 P. 2d 951 ( 1952). Th us it is evident that the volitional test is not arbitrary
and that is is directly related to the purposes of the statute.
The volitional test in the context of a labor dispute has been simply defined:
" ... the one who first resorts to the use of work stoppage as a means of putting
on economic pressure to settle such a dispute must bear the responsibility
therefor." Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, supra, at 372 P. 2d, p. 989.
The reasoning underlying this definition of volition and its application in issues of
labor dispute was succinctly explained by the court in its Kennecott decison:
Only by fixing responsibility in this way can the interest of all parties and of
society be properly protected. The Employment Security Act was designed to
ease the burdens of unemployment and multifarious evils which ramify from it.
Its primary purpose is to assist the worker and his family in times when,
without fault on his part, he is out of work. The secondary purpose is to provide
stability for the general economy by assuring continuity of purchasing power.
It is plainly apparent from the Act that it was not intended to be used as a
weapon in labor strife. (Id, at p. 990) Undoubtedly one of the considerations
prompting the prohibition against workers receiving benefits for unemployment resulting from being involved in a strike is the fact that it would be unfair
to use funds built up by labor and management jointly to support labor in a
co~t~st wherein it was exerting economic pressure against management by
striking or by participating in or supporting a strike so that it was in fact
involved therein. (372 P. 2d, at p. 990)
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The above quoted statement finds considerable similarity in the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Ohio Bureau of Employment Service v. Hodory, 431
U.S 471, 52 L. Ed. 2d 513, 97 S. Ct. 1898 (1977).

The claimant, Hodory, was employed

in Ohio by US. Steel at one of its steel production plants. When the plant's coal supply
was curtailed by a coalminers' strike at a mine owned by U.S. Steel, the claimant was
laid off. The Ohio Bureau of Employment Service denied benefits to the claimant under
a provision in the Ohio unemployment law which disqualified all individuals whose
unemployment arises from a strike at any plant or establishment owned by the
employer. The claimant filed suit in federal district court on the theory that his
unemployment was involuntary and the denial of benefits was therefore in violation of
the Equal Protection clause. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
district court and held the denial of benefits to be constitutional. In so doing the court
looked beyond the effect of the law solely on the recipient and explained:
Appellee thus focuses on the interests of the recipient of unemployment
compensation.
The unemployment compensation statute, however, touches upon more
than just the recipient. It provides for the creation of a fund produced by
contributions from private employers. The rate of an employer's contribution
to the fund varies according to benefits paid to that employer's eligible
employees. Ohio Rev Code Ann §4141.25 (1973). Any action with regard to
disbursements from the unemployment compensation fund thus will affect
both the employer and the fiscal integrity of the fund. Appel lee in effect urges
that the court consider only the needs of the employee seeking compensation.
The decision of the weight to be given the various effects of the statute,
however, is a legislative decision, and appellee's position is contrary to the
principle that "the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power
to impose upon the states their views of what constitutes wise economic or
social policy." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491, 90 S.
Ct. 1153 (1970)
In considering the constitutionality of the statute, therefore, the court must
view its consequences, not only for the recipient of benefits, but also for the
contributors to the fund and for the fiscal integrity of the fund. (52 L. Ed. 2d, p.
528)
In determining whether or not the Ohio disqualification provision has a rational
relation to a legitimate state interest, the court concluded:
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Although the District Court was reacting to appellants' own hyperbole 1n
speaking of financial crises and bankruptcy, it must be recognized that effects
less than pushing the employer to bankruptcy may be rnt1onally viewed as
undesirable. The employer's costs go up with every laid-off worker who 1s
qualified to collect unemployment. The only way for the employer to stop
these rising costs is to settle the strike so as to return the employees to work.
Qualification for unemployment compensation thus acts as a lever increasing
the pressures on an employer to settle a strike. The state has chosen to leave
this lever in existence for situations in which the employer has locked out his
employees, but to eliminate it if the union has made the strike move.
Regardless of our views of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of this form of state
"neutrality" in labor disputes, we cannot say that the approach taken by Ohio
is irrational. (Id, at p. 529)
Although Utah does not charge back to employers the benefits paid their former
employees for purposes of determining the employer's contribution rate, the relation of
the court's analysis to that of Mr. Justice Crockett in the Kennecott case is obvious and
needs no further comment.
The Hodory decision clearly confirms the right of each state to determine its own
approach to the labor dispute issue, so long as the approach selected has a rational
relation to a state interest. The Hodory holding was reaffirmed in the more recent
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Telephone Company, et al., v. New

York State Department of Labor, et al., 440 U.S. 519, 59 L. Ed. 2d 553, 99 S. Ct. 1328
(1979). In upholding the allowance of unemployment benefits to workers on strike, the
court said:
"The voluminous history of the Social Security Act made it abundantly clear
that Congress intended the several states to have broad freedom in setting up
the types of unemployment compensation they wish.
It is clear from the holdings of the Kennecott and Hodory decisions that the
volitional test, as applied to labor disputes, has a rational relation to the purposes of the
Employment Security Act, and is not therefore violative of the Equal Protection clause.
Appellants' contention that the volitional test is not susceptible to proof by the
parties is totally without merit. The labor unions and management have a unique
insight into what transpires in such negotiating sessions and, therefore, are best able to
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provide meaningful evidence on the questions of which party first initiated the use of
economic sanctions and the reasons therefor. The Olaf Nelson decision has been a
matter of public record for approximately 26 years. Both labor and management are or
should be well aware of its requirements in proving which party is at fault for initiating
the use of economic sanctions. Both parties are well aware of the refining of the Nelson
requirements by the decisions of this court in Teamsters, Chauffer's, Etc. v. Orange
Transportation Company, 5 Ut. 2d 45, 296 P. 2d 291 (1956) and Teamsters, Chauffers,
Etc. v. Board of Review, 10 Ut. 2d 63, 348 P. 2d 558 ( 1960), which cases involved these

same litigants. Both parties are sufficiently privy to the actions of their representatives
in the negotiations that it is within their power to provide proper evidence for the
administrative hearing. The volitional test is not based upon assumption or presumption, but only upon the evidence presented by the parties and the resultant facts as
determined by the Appeal Referee.
The volitional test is clearly consistent with the public policy underlying the
Employment Security Act, as stated in the prior pronouncements of this court cited at
the beginning of this Point 111. It is also consistent with the public policy of the state as to
employment relations and collective bargaining, which recognizes the three major
interests involved: the public, the employee and the employer, and which concludes
that:
Industrial peace. regular and adequate income for the employee, and
uninterrupted production of goods and services are promotive of all of these
interests. (Section 34-20-1 (2), U.C.A. 1953.)
The final point of Appellants' Equal Protection argument is that unemployment
benefits were denied to the claimants on the basis of their union membership. The
Referee concluded, however, that all claimants in the case were unemployed due to a
stoppage of work involving their grade, class or group. (R.00031) There is no evidence
whatsoever that any claimant was denied benefits because of union membership.
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POINT IV
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH OR
THE UNITED STATES.
Appellants suggest that use of the volitional test constitutes a denial of due process
on the grounds that it is based on a presumption having no rational basis in fact.
Apparently, the presumption referred to by Appellants is that of fault. However, by
definition he who first resorts to the use of economic sanctions is considered at fault.
The Appeal Referee specifically found that labor was the first to engage in a work
stoppage, and that the economic sanction thus employed was directed against all of
the employers for the benefit of all workers represented by the union and thereby party
to the National Master Freight Agreement.
Appellants also allege they were denied a meaningful hearing in that the Appeal
Referee did not rule on the questions of constitutionality raised by Appellants. In
affirming the denial of benefits the Referee in effect refused to find the statute
unconstitutional. The refusal is proper in that such a finding could only be tentative at
best and only the courts can make a binding decision on a question of law. Utah Hotel
Co. v. Industrial Commission, et al., (Utah, 1944) 151 P. 2d 467, 470. There is no denial
of due process in such a procedure because Appellants have a meaningful remedy in
their right of review by this court, where a binding decision can be made.

CONCLUSION
Appellants became unemployed on April 1, 1979, due to a stoppage of work which
resulted from a strike of the grade, class or group to which they belonged. The strike
was selective against only some of the employers involved in negotiations over a new
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National Master Freight Agreement, but was undertaken as part of a concerted plan of
action directed against all employers on behalf of every employee covered by the
agreement. The use of the volitional test in labor dispute cases is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest-that is, the payment of unemployment benefits to claimants
who are unemployed through no fault of their own. Under the facts of this case the
claimants were properly denied benefits and the decision of the Board of Review
should be affirmed.

ROBERT B. HANSEN,
Attorney General
FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General

K. Allan Zabel
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Defendant's
Brief to Stephen W. Cook, Attorney for Claimants, Littlefield, Cook, and Peterson, Suite
666 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah; and Nathan J. Fullmer, Attorney for
lntermountain Operators League 500 American Building, 61 South Main, Salt Lake
City, Utah, this

day of January, 1980.

K. Allan Zabel
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